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One of the most important responsibilities of ajudge 
advocate in the deployed environment is advising 
commanders on the propriety of the use of military force in 
a given situation. Although most judge advocates realize 
the importance of the rules of engagement in this regard, 
not all appreciate the necessity of understanding the 
underlying legal basis supporting the use of force in a 
specific operational setting. The reality is that absent a 
"situational awareness" of that legal framework there is 
not only the risk that force will be used inappropriately, 
there also is danger of the emergence of "mission creep" as 
the original legal rationale fora mission becomes obscured 
or misunderstood. The risk of this is especially great in the 
kind of complex, hybrid operations we see today. This 
brief article addresses one such operation: the enforcement 
of no-fly zones (NFZs) in Iraq. 
Under current international law the use of force by those 
countries that are members of the United Nations (UN) is 
ordinarily limited to two situations: 1) in self-defense 
pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; and 2) pursuant 
to a resolution of the Security Council. Since 1992 the 
United States has been enforcing a no-fly zone in northern 
and southern Iraq.2 At various times, however, Iraq and 
other countries have asserted that the no-fly zone 
enforcement regime is illegal under international law. The 
central contention is that there is no explicit UN Security 
Council resolution authorizing the NFZs. While it is true 
that there is no such resolution per se, it does not 
necessarily follow that there is no legal basis for the NFZs. 
Specifically, the basic authority for the NFZs in Iraq is 
traceable to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 678, dated November 29, 1990. This is the 
original resolution that authorized the use of force in the 
Gulf War. In the text, the Security Council authorized 
"Member States cooperating with the government of 
Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold ... all 
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international 
peace and security to the area." The "all means necessary" 
language encompasses the use of force under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. 
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Following the cease-fire agreement with the Gulf War 
coalition in 1991, Iraq nevertheless proceeded to engage in 
major military operations against members of its own 
population. Kurds in the north and Shias in the south were 
subjected to a series of counter-insurgency operations, often 
marked by exceptionally brutal actions against innocent 
civilians. Consequently, in April of 1991, the Security 
Council passed a further resolution that condemned Irilq for 
repressing its civilian population "in many parts of Iraq". 
Furthermore, that resolution (UNSCR 688) stated that such 
actions threatened "international peace and security in the 
region". Because of continued attacks upon civilians in 
Southern Iraq, the coalition took action to "restore 
international peace" by issuing a demarche advising the 
government of Iraq that a no-fly zone was established south 
of 32 degrees north latitude. By denying it the use of its still-
significant inventory of combat aircraft, this action was 
designed to diminish Iraq's capability to attack its own 
people. Coalition aircraft began patrolling the NFZs to 
ensure that policy set forth in the demarch was observed. 
Judge advocates should understand, however, that operators 
often misunderstand the nature of demarches. They 
sometimes assume a demarche has the same legal effect as a 
UNSCR itself. This, of course, is not the case. A demarche 
is simply a government-to-government communique. While 
it may reflect international law, it does not itself constitute 
independent legal authority. Nevertheless, in this instance it 
did, in fact, reflect international law in that it was based on a 
Security Council resolution that does constitute legal 
authority. 
It is, of course, true that some countries, including even a 
few allies of the United States, maintain that notwithstanding 
the legitimacy of the original Security Council directives, the 
demarches establishing the NFZs exceed the scope of the 
supporting resolutions. However, one might legitimately 
conclude that the complete absence of Security Council 
action in the intervening years, to either rescind the 
supporting resolutions or direct the discontinuance of the 
NFZ, illustrates that the legitimacy of the NFZ's regime is 
accepted international practice. 
It should be noted, however, that the legal basis for such uses 
of force as Operation Desert Fox's air strikes is not exactly 
the same as that for the NFZ. Essentially, Desert Fox was 
based on UNSCR 687, the resolution that brought about the 
cease-fire after Desert Storm. UNSCR 687 required, among 
other things, that Iraq destroy all stocks of chemical and 
biological weapons, as well as the related research, 
development, support and manufacturing facilities. In 
addition, that resolution required Iraq to agree to an on-site 
inspection regime by the U.N. Special Commission 
(UNSCOM). A series of subsequent resolutions (along with 
formal statements to the Security Council by the United 
States and others) expressed international concern about 
Iraq's compliance with its obligations. 
When Iraq elected to expel UNSCOM inspectors in 
December of 1998, it placed itself in violation of the cease-
fire agreement. Thus, the authority found in UNSCR 
678, (the original Gulf War UNSCR authorizing "all 
necessary means" under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) 
provided the basis to launch the attacks aimed at forcing 
Iraqi compliance with the mandated inspection regime 
and diminishing its capacity to produce weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Following Desert Fox, Iraq engaged in an intense series 
of provocative actions (ranging from NFZ violations to 
the firing of missiles and anti-aircraft artillery at 
coalition aircraft) that threatened the safety of coalition 
aircrews enforcing the NFZ. As a result, U.S. and 
British forces have repeatedly been required to attack 
various elements of Iraq's air defense system. Again, the 
legal authority for these actions is traceable to the 
original UNSCRs authorizing the Gulf War itself. 
There are a number of lessons-learned from operations in 
Southwest Asia that are applicable elsewhere. For 
example, legal advisors need to ensure that commanders 
understand that the authority to use force is not 
unlimited. It must be demonstrated in each instance that 
a particular use of force is related to the purpose for 
which the UNSCR was issued. Moreover, this analysis 
may also affect the propriety of attacking a particular 
target. Of course, recourse to a UNSCR is not necessary 
when force is being used in self-defense as provided by 
Article 51. 
As indicated at the beginning of this essay, it is 
imperative that the deploying or supporting judge 
advocate become familiar with the legal authority for the 
use of force in his or her particular situation. There are a 
number of sources for obtaining this information - not 
the least of which is the legal staff of the Combatant 
Command conducting the operation. Another source that 
I've found helpful is the White House Website 
(www.whitehouse.goY}. 
It seems to be among the earliest unclassified sources for 
material helpful in determining the legal basis for a given 
operation. Once the legal basis is determined (and vetted 
by the appropriate higher authorities in the chain of 
command), it is a good idea to reduce it to a one-page 
talker and get it distributed to the staff. This allows 
everyone to be (quite literally!) on the same sheet of 
music. It is especially important to ensure that the senior 
leadership - particularly those. who may be speaking to 
the press - understand the legal rationale. Keep in mind 
that the specific legal basis may also affect the legal 
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status of those involved. In short, it is vital that everyone has a 
grasp of this issue; otherwise, you expose your operation to 
misunderstandings and miscalculations that can undermine its 
ultimate success. 
Col Dunlap has authored numerous articles on national security 
affairs. He previously served as the Staff Judge Advocate for 
USSTRATCOM. Since becoming the SJAfor USCENTAF, he has 
deployed twice to the Middle East, most recently as the legal 
advisor to USCENTAFICC during Desert Fox. 
1 The author wishes to thank Lt Col Norman Jacobson for his considerable 
assistance in the preparation of this article. 
2 Great Britain and France have joined the U.S. in enforcing NFZs in southern 
Iraq. 
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